

Application No. 09/995,287  
After Final Office Action of March 29, 2006

Docket No.: 65678-0043

### **REMARKS**

This response is intended to be fully responsive to the final Office Action ("Office Action") having a mailing date of March 29, 2006, wherein claims 32-62 were rejected. Claims 43 and 44 are amended. Applicants have carefully reviewed the office action and thank the Examiner for the detailed review of the pending claims.

### **Claim Objections**

#### **i. Summary**

Claims 43, 44, 52, 53, 61, and 62 were objected to under 37 C.F.R. 1.75(c). The Examiner did not respond to Applicants' prior arguments to the claim objections and Applicants again traverse the objections.

Moreover, the objections of claims 43 and 44 do not apply to claims 52, 53, 61, and 62. Therefore, the objections are traversed.

#### **ii. Claims 43 and 44**

Claims 43, 44, 52, 53, 61, and 62 were objected to under 37 C.F.R. 1.75(c). The Examiner has not responded to Applicants' prior arguments to the claim objections and Applicants again traverse the objections. In the Office Action, the Examiner stated that:

"[C]laim 36 requires a step of "prompting ... a question". Claim 43, on the other hand recites "determining if the question is required to be prompted". This is conditional language (i.e. determining if), hence if it has been determined that a question *is not* required to be prompted, according to the MPEP (MPEP 608.01(n)) claim 43 would not then *further limit* claim 36, as any actions that proceed from the question being prompted (e.g. "receiving a response to the question") would not occur."

(See the Office Action, Pages 4 and 5; Emphasis in original). The Examiner then states that MPEP 608.01(n) ¶ 7.36 requires Applicants to cancel the claim(s), or amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, or rewrite the claim(s) in

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independent form. (See the Office Action, Page 5). The Examiner has apparently concluded that each and every possible outcome of a process claim must be evaluated separately in an independent claim. However, Applicants note that the claims should be read in their entirety and that certain claim elements should not be read in isolation.

Moreover, the Examiner's argument is not a logical application for a method claim because methods by their nature may include branches that further limit the scope of the claim. A further limiting branch maintains the parent claim's original limitations, albeit on a branch, and necessarily adds additional new limitations. The Examiner appears to be focusing on one possible outcome of the method claim, rather than the method claim as a whole to apply the meaning of "further limiting."

For dependent claim 43, the Examiner appears to be requiring an independent claim for any further decisional step added to an element of independent claim 36. If the Examiner requires independent claims for each and every possible branch added in a dependent claim, Applicants would be limited only to claiming an invention in independent claims. Thus, any detail including a branch that further defines a method would require an independent claim to fully describe a method in detail. In this way, the Examiner's objection goes against the very nature of dependent claims in further limiting the scope of an invention.

Again, as Applicants have argued in the last response, MPEP § 608.01(n), under the heading "II. Treatment Of Improper Dependent Claims," states "[c]laims which are in improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of a previous claim should be objected to under 37 CFR 1.75(c) by using form paragraph 7.36." However, MPEP § 608.01(n), under heading "III. Infringement Test," states "[a] dependent claim does not lack compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph, simply because there is a question as to (1) the significance of the further limitation added by the dependent claim or (2) whether the further limitation in fact changes the scope of the dependent claim from that of the claim from which it depends. The test for a proper dependent claim under the fourth

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paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 is whether the dependent claim includes every limitation of the claim from which it depends. The test is not one of whether the claims differ in scope.”

As is the case with dependent claim 43, the addition of a condition to a limitation of an independent claim does not remove the limitation from the independent claim. Indeed, the addition of a condition now further limits the claim by including a further step. Dependent claim 43, for example, includes a further limitation to the “prompting” step of independent claim 36. The “prompting” step of claim 36 is not removed from claim 43.

As stated above, the test for proper dependency “is whether the dependent claim includes every limitation of the claim from which it depends.” (See MPEP § 608.01(n), under heading “III. Infringement Test”). As applied to dependent claim 43, none of the parent claim’s limitations have been removed. Under the “infringement test” analysis, dependent claim 43 does include each and every limitation of claim 36. Thus, dependent claim 43 passes the “infringement test” and is a proper dependent claim because claim 43 includes every limitation of the claim from which it depends (claim 36).

Similarly, dependent claims 44, 52, 53, 61, and 62 also pass the “infringement test” analysis as defined by MPEP § 608.01(n). Therefore, the objections should be withdrawn. If the Examiner maintains the objections to claims 43, 44, 52, 53, 61, and 62, Applicants respectfully request that the Examiner provide an argument as to how the independent claim limitations are supposedly removed from the claim when read in the entirety.

**iii. Claims 52, 53, 61, and 62**

The Examiner objected to claims 52, 53, 61, and 62 “as each recites similar language to claim 43.” (See the Office Action, Page 7).

Applicants point out that claims 52, 53, 61, and 62 are not directed to the “step” of claim 36 that the Examiner alleges claim 43 does not further limit. Indeed, claims 52 and 53 are directed to “[a] wireless device” (see independent claim 46) and claims 61 and 62 refer to a “system” (see independent claim 55). Thus, because claims 52, 53, 61, and 62 are not

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"method" claims, the Examiner's reason for objecting to claims 43 and 44 does not apply to claims 52, 53, 61, and 62. Therefore, the Examiner has failed to properly object to claims 52, 53, 61, and 62 and the objections are traversed.

If the Examiner maintains the objections, Applicants request that the Examiner provide reasoning as to why each and every claim is objected to.

### **Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 112**

#### **iv. Summary**

Claims 36-62 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

#### **v. Arguments**

##### **a. Claims 36, 46, and 55**

Claim 36 recites in part:

"prompting, independent of an active communication link between the wireless device and wireless infrastructure, a question related to operational status of the asset for the operator"

##### **1. The Examiner's Current Rejection**

In the Office Action, the Examiner has pointed to the above portion of claim 36 for rejecting claim 36. The Examiner stated that "the second claimed limitation is directed to performing a 'prompting' without utilizing the wireless communication system... Therefore, it is not clear to one of ordinary skill what is Applicant's claimed method and the scope of the method." (See the Office Action, Pages 6 and 7). Indeed, the rejection asserted by the Examiner is vague and does not provide any guidance as to why the plain language of the

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claim is not understood. Thus, Applicants are not able to appropriately respond with specificity to what the Examiner does not understand from the plain language of the claim.

Applicants argue that the plain language of the claim particularly describes the invention. For example, the step of "prompting" is in part "independent of an active communication link between the wireless device and wireless infrastructure," as claim 36 recites. Further, the step of "prompting" is described in part comprising "a question related to operational status of the asset for the operator," as claim 36 recites. Thus, the claim limitations clearly and definitely describe the claimed method and the scope of the method and the Examiner's rejection is traversed.

## **2. The Examiner's Response to Applicants' Prior Arguments**

The Examiner stated that "it is not clear to one of ordinary skill whether or not the wireless communication system having a wireless infrastructure and a wireless device is actually utilized." (See the Office Action, Page 4). Applicants note that claim 36 clearly indicates that "independent of an active communication link between the wireless device and wireless infrastructure" applies to the step of "prompting." As explained above, the Examiner's rejection is traversed.

### **b. Independent Claims 46 and 55**

The Examiner states that "[c]laims 46 and 55 recite similar language" to claim 36. (See the Office Action, Page 6). For at least the same reasons as claim 36 argued above, claims 46 and 55 are in condition for allowance.

### **c. Dependent Claims 37-45, 47-54, and 56-62**

Claims 37-45, 47-54, and 56-62 were rejected as they depend from claims 36, 46, and 55, respectively. For at least the same reasons discussed above as to claims 36, 46, and 55, claims 37-45, 47-54, and 56-62 are in condition for allowance.

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**d. Claim 39**

Claim 39 recites in part:

“receiving a new question by the wireless device from the wireless infrastructure; and updating the question.”

The Examiner stated that “[t]o one of ordinary skill, this is unclear as a ‘new’ question replaces an ‘old’ question one [sic], while updating a question may result in only a slight modification.” (See the Office Action, Page 7). Applicants note that claim 39 clearly describes “receiving a new question” and “updating the question.” Claim 39 does not describe an ‘old’ question. Thus, it appears that the Examiner is attempting to read in limitations that are not present in the claim language. The specific method of “updating the question” is not described in claim 39 and arbitrary details should not be read in by the Examiner in this rejection.

Moreover, for the purposes of this rejection under § 112 paragraph 2, the Examiner has shown that one skilled in the art does understand the meaning of “receiving a new question” and “updating the question.” By way of the Examiner’s rejection, the Examiner has posed a question as to a specific implementation of the claim. Thus, by the Examiner’s own rejection, and by the plain meaning of “receiving a new question” and “updating the question,” the rejection is traversed.

**e. Claims 43 and 44**

Claim 43 recites in part:

“determining if the question is required to be prompted for the operator; and performing said prompting of the question to the operator, receiving a response to the question, and storing the response to the question, if said determining results in the affirmative.”

(As amended).

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### **1. Rejections in the Office Action**

By way of the amendment, Applicants traverse the Examiner's objections. The steps of "receiving" and "storing" are appropriately further limited with respect to claim 43. Applicants further note that the amendment should be read in light of the claim as a whole. Claim 44 has been similarly amended to traverse the rejection.

### **2. Prior Alleged Rejections**

The Examiner stated that "[c]laims 43, 44, 52, 53, 61, and 62 also remain rejected as it is unclear as to whether the step of 'responding', for example in claims 36, 46 and 55, occur if it is determined that the question does not need to be prompted." (See the Office Action, Page 4). However, Applicants cannot find a reference to the Examiner's earlier rejection or objection that would lead to the "remain rejected" language in the Office Action's "Response to Arguments" section. For the sake of expedited examination, Applicants respond based on an assumption that the Examiner refers to an objection rather than a rejection, and that the objection is founded in section 112 paragraph 2. As such, Applicants' amendments of claims 43 and 44 traverse the Examiner's alleged prior objection.

### **f. Claims 52, 53, 61, and 62**

#### **1. Rejections in the Office Action**

Claims 52 and 53 depend from claim 46 which claims "[a] wireless device." Claims 52 and 53 in part further define the "processing unit" of independent claim 46. Moreover, claims 61 and 62 refer to the "system" of independent claim 55 and further define a means as part of the system.

The Examiner attempted to reject dependent claims 52 and 53 that are directed to "[a] wireless device" (see independent claim 46) because "each recites similar language to claim 43" (see the Office Action, Page 7) which is directed to a "method" (see independent claim 36). In sum, the Examiner has rejected device claims 52 and 53 based entirely on reasoning to reject method claim 43 that includes "similar language" (see the Office Action, Page 6).

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Therefore, the Examiner has not properly rejected claims 52 and 53 at least because the claim is not identical to claim 43, and because the rejection is improperly used to reject device claims 52 and 53.

Moreover, claims 61 and 62 are directed to a "system" and are also rejected by the Examiner using the same reasoning as claim 43. This rejection is also improper as the Examiner applied a "method" rejection to a "system" claim.

At least because the rejections of claims 52, 53, 61, and 62 are improper, Applicants traverse the rejections.

## **2. Prior Alleged Rejections**

Additionally, the Examiner stated that "[c]laims ... 52, 53, 61, and 62 also remain rejected as it is unclear as to whether the step of 'responding', for example in claims 36, 46 and 55, occur if it is determined that the question does not need to be prompted." (See the Office Action, Page 4). As explained above with respect to claims 43 and 44, Applicants have not located the alleged prior rejection. As explained above, a rejection specific to a "method" claim cannot be used to reject the "device" and "system" of claims 53, 53 and 61, 62, respectively.

## **Claim Rejections – 35 U.S.C. § 103**

### **i. Summary**

Claim 32-62 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over U.S. Patent 6,148,297 to Swor et al. ("Swor") in view of U.S. Patent 5,915,973 to Hoehn-Saric et al. ("Hoehn-Saric"). Applicants respectfully traverse the foregoing rejections.

### **ii. The Law**

MPEP § 2143 sets forth the basic requirements for the Patent and Trademark Office to establish prima facie obviousness as follows: "To establish a prima facie case of obviousness, three criteria must be met. First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the



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reference or to combine reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references when combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations." MPEP § 2143. A case of obviousness requires that there be some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings. See MPEP § 2143; *In re Linter*, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560, 562 (CCPA 1972). The mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination. *In re Mills*, 916 F.2d 680, 16 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990), *W.L. Gore and Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.* 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir., 1966). Moreover, the fact that the claimed invention is within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art is not sufficient by itself to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness without some objective reason to combine the teachings of the references. *Ex parte Levengood*, 28 USPQ2d 1300 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1993).

*In re Oetiker* further provides that "[t]here must be some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would make the combination." *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). "The Examiner must show reasons that the skilled artisan, confronted with the same problem as the inventor and with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would select the elements from the cited prior art references for combination in the manner claimed." *In re Rouffet*, 47 USPQ2d 1453, at 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added).

As established by Federal Circuit precedent, to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the Examiner must provide some suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine the reference teachings. See, e.g., *Ex parte Clapp*, 227 USPQ 972, 973 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985) ("To support the conclusion that the claimed invention is directed to obvious subject matter, either the references must expressly or impliedly suggest the claimed invention or the Examiner must present a convincing line of reasoning as to why the artisan would have found the claimed invention to have been obvious in light of the teachings of the references"); *In re Geiger*,

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815 F.2d 686, 688, 2 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“When a rejection depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the references”); *ACS Hosp. Sys. v. Montefiore Hosp.*, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion supporting the combination”); *accord*. MPEP § 2143.

It is established law that one “cannot use hindsight reconstruction to pick and choose among isolated disclosures in the prior art to deprecate the claimed invention.” *Ecolochem, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.*, 227 F.3d 1361, 1371, 56 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing *In re Fine*, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075, 5 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Indeed, “[c]ombining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability – the essence of hindsight.” *In re Dembiczak*, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination.” *In re Mills*, 916 F.2d 680, 16 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

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iii. Arguments

i. Independent Claim 36

Claim 36 recites in part:

“[a] method for utilizing a wireless communications system having a wireless infrastructure and a wireless device associated with the asset, said method comprising:

receiving an operator identifier from an operator of the asset;  
prompting, independent of an active communication link  
between the wireless device and wireless infrastructure, a question  
related to operational status of the asset for the operator;  
receiving a response to the question; and  
storing the response to the question.”

(Emphasis added).

1. “wireless”

The Examiner stated that “Swor et al. teach [sic] a portable unit such as a personal digital assistant (column 4, lines 45-67; column 5, lines 13-17) used for safety education where education comprises certification courses and tests (column 5, lines 33-44). To one of ordinary skill the portable digital assistant or any of the portable units are wireless as they contain modems and are for use in vehicles such as a blood collection vehicle.” (See the Office Action, Page 2). Additionally, the Examiner states that “Swor et al. teach ... a wireless communication system (i.e. wireless device and infrastructure) (column 4, lines 45-52).” (See the Office Action, Page 8). The Examiner has not shown any wireless infrastructure disclosed in either reference.

Hence, it appears that the Examiner is attempting to read the term “wireless” into a personal digital assistant. Thus, Applicants request support for the taking of Official Notice, as provided by 37 C.F.R. 1.104(d)(2) and MPEP § 2144.03, particularly in the context of the claimed invention. If documentary evidence of such Official Notice is not provided in the next Office Action, Applicants respectfully submit that the rejection must be withdrawn.

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**2. "an operator identifier from an operator of the asset"**

Neither Swor nor Hoehn-Saric disclose "an operator identifier from an operator of the asset." (Emphasis added). The Examiner appears to maintain the rejection by contending that "Hoehn-Saric et al. teach authenticating a user." (See the Office Action, Page 2). However, authenticating a user may be implemented in a variety of ways. Thus, the Examiner has not shown where the passage allegedly discloses "an operator identifier from an operator of the asset." (Emphasis added).

Thus, the Examiner has not particularly pointed to where either reference teaches the claim limitations. Therefore, the rejection must be withdrawn.

**3. "a question related to operation status of the asset"**

Claim 36 also requires "a question related to operation status of the asset." Neither Swor nor Hoehn-Saric disclose the prompting of such a question. The Examiner appears to maintain the rejection by contending that "Hoehn-Saric et al. teach prompting a user for a question." (See the Office Action, Page 2). However, the passage does not disclose "a question related to operation status of the asset."

Thus, the Examiner has not particularly pointed to where either reference teaches the claim limitations. Therefore, the rejection must be withdrawn.

**4. "prompting, independent of an active communication link"**

Further, claim 36 requires "prompting, independent of an active communication link," that neither Swor nor Hoehn-Saric disclose. The Examiner states that "Hoehn-Saric also teach prompting a question independent of an active communication link as the questions are downloaded to and stored by the test taking device (column 8, lines 52-56)." (See the Office Action, Page 8).

Moreover, the Examiner stated that "Hoehn-Saric et al. also teach [sic] prompting a question for a user independent of a communication link between a remote testing device (figure 1, item 3) and data link that allows for communication between the central station and the remote device." (See the Office Action, Page 3). Applicants note that the statement made by the Examiner is not

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disclosed in the detail asserted by the Examiner and certainly does not disclose the Examiner's assertions related to a communication link and a data link.

The passages cited by the Examiner do not disclose each and every claim limitation recited by claim 36. Hoehn-Saric does not contemplate communication link activity. Hoehn-Saric merely discloses that "test question data is communicated to remote test site 3." (See Hoehn-Saric, Col. 8, Lines 54-55). Hoehn-Saric does not suggest "prompting, independent of an active communication link," as claim 36 recites.

#### **5. General Allegations made by the Examiner**

The Examiner asserts that "the user uploads the completed exam back to the central station." (See the Office Action, Page 3). However, the passage cited does not disclose the user taking such action.

Additionally, the Examiner asserts that "In order to take the test the remote device is not in continuous communication with central station (i.e. test source), therefore, even if the data link is down (figure 1, items 1 and 3), the user will still be prompted to answer the first question as the questions are stored at the remote device (column 8, lines 52-55; column 9, lines 3-4)." (See the Office Action, Page 3). However, the statement by the Examiner includes details not shown in Hoehn-Saric or Swor. These details appear to be inferences derived from reading Applicants' claims. Thus, the Examiner is improperly importing teachings that are not disclosed in either reference.

Moreover, the Examiner alleges that Applicants have not sufficiently challenged the Examiner's assertion of the facts. (See the Office Action, Page 5). Applicants challenge the sufficiency of the Examiner's assertion of the facts. For example, the Examiner alleges as admitted prior art that "updating exam questions, for example by changing questions, in order to introduce new topics, emphasize or de-emphasize material, and the memorization of questions" (See Office Action, Page 5). However, Applicants note that the updating of questions is discussed in the prior office action in the section related to 35 U.S.C. § 112.

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Moreover, the Examiner states that "data cannot be communicated successfully from one device to another unless there is a connection between the two." However, data can be communicated successfully, for example, where a communication path is established. Data may even be communicated from one device to another by disk or other fixed media. Applicants note that at least the "communication link" of claim 36 has been discussed at length in the Response filed January 23, 2006.

Because neither Swor nor Hoehn-Saric discloses each and every limitation, claim 36 is in condition for allowance. Further, claims 37-45 depend from claim 36. Therefore, for at least the same reasons as claim 36, claims 37-45 are in condition for allowance.

**iv. Claims 37, 47 and 56**

Claim 37 requires:

"determining that an active communication link between the asset and wireless infrastructure exists; and

transmitting the stored response to the wireless infrastructure from the wireless device if an active communication link exists, otherwise, maintaining the response to the question."

(Emphasis added).

**1. Improper Taking of Official Notice**

In the Response filed January 23, 2006, Applicants requested the taking of Official Notice of the claim limitation reciting "determining that an active communication link between the asset and wireless infrastructure exists." Applicants challenge the Examiner's apparent taking of Official Notice in the Office Action pursuant to 37 C.F.R. 1.104(d)(2) and MPEP § 2144.03 (C). Thus, provided the arguments below, "the examiner must provide documentary evidence in the next Office action if the rejection is to be maintained." MPEP § 2144.03 (C).

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**a. "wireless"**

The Examiner has erred in the first instance by alleging that "Swor et al. teach a wireless communication system." (See the Office Action, Page 8). As clearly shown above with respect to claim 36, no such wireless communication system is taught or even suggested by Swor.

**b. "determining that an active communication link between the asset and wireless infrastructure exists"**

Moreover, the Examiner has erred by attempting to show in Swor the recited "determining that an active communication link between the asset and wireless infrastructure exists." The Examiner states that "it is well known that data cannot be communicated successfully from one device to another unless there is a connection between the two." (See the Office Action, Pages 8 and 9). However, the Examiner's statement does not teach or suggest the claim element.

Thus, because Swor and Hoehn-Saric do not disclose each and every limitation, claim 37 is in condition for allowance. Additionally, claims 47 and 56 include similar claim limitations. Thus, the same arguments apply to claims 47 and 56. Thus, claims 47 and 56 are in condition for allowance.

**v. Independent Claims 46 and 55**

Independent claims 46 and 55 include limitations similar to claim 36. These limitations are also absent from the combination of Swor and Hoehn-Saric. Thus, for at least the same reasons as the similar limitations of claim 36, independent claims 46 and 55 are in condition for allowance. Further, claims 47-54 and 56-62 depend from claims 46 and 55, respectively. Thus, for at least the same reasons as claims 46 and 55, claims 47-54 and 56-62 are in condition for allowance.

**vi. Dependent Claims 39, 48 and 57**

Claims 39, 48, and 57 were rejected as the Examiner:

"takes Official Notice of the updating of exam questions, for example by changing questions, in order to introduce new topics, emphasize or de-emphasize material, and the memorization of questions."

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(See Office Action, Page 7).

With respect to the taking of Official Notice, In the Response filed January 23, 2006, Applicants requested that the Examiner take official Notice. However, as clearly dictated by the MPEP and supporting authority, it is "not ... appropriate for the examiner to take official notice of facts without citing a prior art reference where the facts asserted to be well known are not capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being well-known." MPEP 2144.03 (A) (emphasis in original).

In the Office Action, even after Applicants requested the taking of Official Notice, the Examiner has not provided any rationale or prior art reference as to why claims 39, 48, and 57 were Officially Noticed. Thus, the rejection of claims 39, 48, and 57 should be withdrawn.



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In view of the above amendment, applicant believes the pending application is in condition for allowance.

Applicant believes no fee is due with this response. However, if a fee is due, please charge our Deposit Account No. 18-0013, under Order No. 65678-0043 from which the undersigned is authorized to draw.

Dated: May 30, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

By 

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